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From creating to managing resorts
Emerging stakeholder group rationales in the Tarentaise valley
Emmanuelle George-Marcelpoil et Hugues François
1 Developing tourist facilities in the mountains is often based on an approach evoking its
“enhancement” (Guérin, 1984) and involving sustained investment. However, as B.Larique
demonstrates (2006), local stakeholders are not passive and are progressively taking over
the tourism sector. The question then arises of the balance between local control and
external funding. In this respect, fitting out the high-altitude sites supported by the Snow
Plan in France is a particularly interesting case-study. The resorts are growth centres, the
dynamics of which structure the entire local economy. The Snow Plan1, a policy defined at
national level,  and instigated by government agencies,  thus appears rather as a non-
regional movement leaving little room for local stakeholders, at least during its heyday in
the period 1965-1975.
2 However, there is no getting away from the major role played by the Savoie department
(administrative  region)  in  stimulating  the  functional  integration  of  the  resorts  at
Courchevel and the overall development of a high-altitude site for tourism. This resulted
in an approach defended and subsequently implemented by government agencies via
decentralised administration of the equipment before it had its own national agency, the
SEATM2. Subsequent recourse to private investors then made it possible to go beyond the
capacity of a public stakeholder (the department) alone to deploy the integrated resort
concept. Defining the parts played by local control and the use of external means has
proven difficult to achieve. 
3 The first part of our contribution will therefore analyse how the national tourism policy
has been regionalised, with a network of local stakeholders interacting with stakeholders
from outside the Tarentaise valley. This process has permitted the arrival of stakeholders
who today have a central role in the management of high altitude sites. The forming of
this innovative sector involves the recognition of localised stakeholder coordinations,
which  have  been  qualified  in  the  industrial  sector,  by  concepts  which  are  widely
publicised today,  of  industrial  districts  (Becattini,  1992),  localised production systems
(Courlet, 1994), innovative regions (Crevoisier and Maillat, 1995) or clusters (Schmitz H.,
From creating to managing resorts
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 100-3 | 2012
1
Nadvi K., 1999). The specific features of the resort stakeholder systems were confirmed
through the concept of the Localised Tourism System (Perret, 1994). The characteristics
of  tourism,  an activity  allowing the  accommodating  of  a  temporary  population does
indeed lend itself  better than others to an interpretation mobilising the interplay of
stakeholders  in  connection  with  the  macroeconomic  context.  Indeed,  interactions
between  service  providers  of  different  kinds  (mainly  leisure,  accommodation  and
catering) contribute directly to the emergence of a destination and its attractiveness. 
4 In this analytical context, reading the strategies of the stakeholders managing the ski
areas will be the focus of the second part. It will show how group of cableway companies
approaches emerge through the local management of resorts which are closer to a sector-
based approach than a regional vision, questioning the economic added value for the
regions involved.  This question of  the local  effects of  winter tourism also guides the
action of the Savoie département in terms of support for resorts, action which we will be
deciphering in the third and final part. 
5 With regard to methodology, this contribution is based on the analysis of the germination
and development of resorts in the Tarentaise valley (Marcelpoil et al., 2011, 2012). For
this purpose, we have used a vast amount of material, based on the examination of the
regional and municipal archives and of private resources and semi-directed interviews
with  40  private  and  public  stakeholders,  both  individuals  and  organisations.  The
conclusions  put  forward in this  article  are  the fruit  of  the analysis  of  this  material.
However,  given its  sensitive  nature,  we have opted for generic  conclusions  with the
occasional use of verbatim reports when the authors cannot be identified. 
 
The Snow Plan, or the local side of a national policy
6 Many authors have drawn attention to the fact that rather than an actual exercise in
planning, the Snow Plan refers first and foremost to an intention, or even a doctrine
(Knafou, 1978; François, 2007). As far back as 1964, the purpose of setting up the CIATM or
CIAM3 was to coordinate the government’s action through the expertise of the SEATM,
founded in 1972, based on a team of experts from the Chambéry equipment division4. The
actual  roots  of  the  Snow Plan are  thus  more  localised than doctrine  would have us
believe. More specifically, it is part of a desire to control the national development of
winter tourism at a local level (Marcelpoil et al., 2010; Marcelpoil et François, 2012), with a
rotation of the Savoyard elite and an upheaval in the traditional values of  mountain
societies. Calling upon the government for assistance was made possible by the ability of
the  local  stakeholders  to  deliver  a  message  about  the  technicalities  of  the  modern
organisation of winter sports, more often than not after initial training outside the Savoie
area. This message is passed on in parallel by politicians with a real national dimension.
With regard to the technical side, most of the major stakeholders had roots in the Savoie
region,  notably L. Chappis,  from Aix-les-Bains,  and M. Michaud,  from Saint-Genix-sur-
Guiers5.  Even  so,  although  the  breeding  ground  of  the  promoters  was  Savoie,  the
deployment of the resorts throughout the Tarine valley brought in a broad spectrum of
investors. 
7 In this context, Courchevel played a founding role in the history of the resorts. As the
prototype integrated resort, it was the first brick in the trial-and-error process applied to
different  fields,  property  management,  the  single  developer  or  the  conditions  under
which local authorities intervened. The property issue, present right from the start of the
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departmental project, refers back to the experience of Val d’Isère. The growth of tourism
in Val d’Isère and the profits made from the sale of property whetted investors’ appetites
and the effects of speculation were uppermost in the minds of the developers directing
the  layout  of  the  regional  resort.  The  village  of  Saint-Bon,  willing  to  make  its  land
available to the département free of charge, was then selected, establishing the lowest
altitude for the urban development of the resort at 1800m. The property issue began to
accelerate  due  to  the  order  of  1958  (order  No. 58-997)  which  allowed  villages to
expropriate owners in the public interest of projects awarded to private stakeholders.
This  measure  allowed land to  be  acquired  at  the  price  of  farmland in  order  to  sell
apartments at tourist accommodation rates, thus generating a considerable value-added
factor.  Expropriation became systematic  for  the building of  third generation resorts,
placing the municipality in a strategic position (Perret, 1992; Marcelpoil et al., 2011). The
municipality  also  provided  part  of  the  communal  equipment.  The  government’s
participation took the form of financial participation in various funds (FDES6, FSIR7, FAL8)
in addition to its technical expertise, but this did not cover all the public investment
costs. Construction of the resort itself was, as dictated by the doctrine, entrusted to a
private company acting as the “sole developer”9.
8 At Courchevel, the département developed a coherent site focused on winter sports. It
took charge of equipping the ski area and orchestrated the urban development, but did
not  directly  manage  the  real  estate  projects  based  on  a  broad  spectrum  of  private
initiatives. M. Michaud confirmed the central role of the ski lifts in the economic model of
the resorts. The considerable initial investment in ski lifts ultimately became the main
source of  profit  for a resort,  as shown by the success at  Courchevel,  which achieved
financial stability in 1956 (Marcelpoil et al., 2010). However, although having funded site
identification with the potential to be developed into resorts at the start of the 1960’s, the
Savoie département, which had already heavily invested in Courchevel, took a backseat
and left the development of these sites to private operators. Private initiatives required
quicker results in order to be viable. The concept of global development of sites thus
emerged with the aim of achieving urban development in proportion to the development
of the ski area. The mechanism was therefore as follows: the construction and subsequent
sale of flats as second homes brought in profits which balanced the cost of equipping the
ski area. Some (particularly Perret, 1992) described this as a vicious circle, whereby the
sale  of  property  contributed to  filling  the  ski  lifts  to  maximum capacity,  until  their
saturation required further investment, in turn funded by property development leading
to renewed saturation of the lifts, etc. 
9 Progressively, concessions for development purposes became concessions for operation,
anticipating the Public Service Delegation measure between the municipality and the
current operator, the Société des Trois Vallées. Other factors favoured this relation, such
as the FAL, a fund with government participation, encouraging the installation of a resort
on municipal  land,  reserving a share for “new resorts”.  The more the municipalities
invested and borrowed, the more they received from the fund. Subcontracting is thus
indirectly, but strongly encouraged. Municipalities invested in ski lift equipment which
they then hired out to operators for the amount of the annual payment of the loan they
had taken out. 
10 From the point of view of principles, the figure of the sole developer directly structured
the interplay of the stakeholders today encountered in resorts, but it is also instructive to
look at the stakeholders who brought about the concept of the sole developer with the
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emblematic example of the Belleville valley. When the Trois-Vallées resort was originally
planned, the land belonging to Saint-Martin-de-Belleville seemed the most suitable for
the location of the resort, but the departmental mission found itself up against opposition
from  the  inhabitants.  However,  a  few  years  later,  the  success  of  Courchevel  in  the
neighbouring town allowed Joseph Fontanet, a fervent defender of the integrated resort
concept within the Conseil Général (Council of the Département), to carry through the
project for the resort at Saint-Martin-de Belleville after becoming the Mayor. With this
end in mind, J. Fontanet intended to benefit  from the same advantages as Saint-Bon-
Courchevel.
11 As the département was at this time deeply involved in Courchevel, the idea of the sole
developer germinated with the constitution of the SODEVAB10 in 1961. The aim was to
find funding above and beyond that available from the département only, with from 1959
onwards,  the  support  of  the  Caisse  des  Dépôts  et  Consignations  (CDC),  of  which the
current Compagnie des Alpes (CDA) is  a subsidiary.  Although the original  aim of  the
SODEVAB  mixed  economy  company  was  to  reproduce  the  income  generated  at
Courchevel in a better-managed context, the private initiative did not come up to the
expectations  of  the  developers  and  the  CDC11 took  over,  creating  SCIVABEL 12.  The
Belleville  valley  therefore  experienced  the  emergence  of  the  concept  of  the  sole
developer (Marcelpoil et al., 2011, 2012) and in just a few years switched from being in
opposition to being a  national  priority  with regard to the development of  mountain
regions for tourism . At the same time, the desire to develop skiing on the glacier at Val
Thorens crystallised environmental opposition to ski resorts and was to lead to the fourth
generation, of which Valmorel is emblematic. Finally, this marked both the end of the
systematic development of mountain regions for tourism purposes and the successful
achievement of developments in the Tarine valley.
 
Structuring of stakeholders and emergence of groups
12 Thanks to their past growth, the large Tarentaise resorts now represent 70%13 of the
Savoie’s power moment14 (which represent 42% of all the winter destination). Logically,
the economic stakeholders organise themselves to operate this tool in the best possible
way  and  current  management  questions  the  share  of  the  regional  variable  in  their
strategies. Once the majority of the resorts are built, the government starts to withdraw
and the transfer of skills and responsibilities to the municipalities hosting the resorts is
initiated  (Decentralisation  laws,  Mountain  laws  of  1985).  As  ski  lifts  are  officially
recognised as a public service under the responsibility of the local authorities, the latter
may therefore opt to manage their production tool themselves or delegate it to a tourism
operator. Today, the status of ski lifts as an industrial and commercial public service
(SPIC) speaks for itself: activity wavers between the role of regional development and the
strong competitive pressures of the tourism market. SPIC incorporates the public and
private spheres in different proportions depending on the period and the stakes15. 
13 Seeking a company to delegate the running of  the ski  lifts  to is  strategic,  given the
operating risk and the regulatory context which is not adapted to the management of a
SPIC which is subject to strong competition (in particular, no captive users as compared
to other services likely to be delegated). The 1980’s and 1990’s highlighted some of the
limits of local authorities in the management of their production tools (in particular, see
criticisms of the Lorit report, 1991 and Pascal report, 1993).
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14 In the context of a mature market, what state of balance can possibly be reached between
the delegating party and the operating company to which it delegates? Today, there are
evident phenomena of exclusion in cases where the competent authorities have not been
able to find an operating company due to operating risks being too great. Climate change
is lending growing weight to the uncertain snow coverage factor in decisions concerning
the  investment  risk16.  The  issue  is  therefore  the  coordination  between  a  regional
approach and a group approach with the aim of maximising and securing the activity of a
resort and the ski lift business structure. To provide some elements of an answer, our
approach examined the policies of two major groups in order to decipher their strategies
per site and understand how they fit together. 
 
Labellemontagne, sharing means at the service of regional
development?
15 The originality of the Labellemontagne policy lies in its choice of management focusing
on resorts considered to be medium-sized both by their size and altitude.  The group
judges  that  these  resorts  represent  interesting  growth  margins  compared  to  the
investment required to manage them. There is room for manoeuvre not only in the ski
area whose development can be optimised, but also in that of tourist accommodation. The
crossed property/ski lift strategy adopted by this group has a specific feature: here, the
accommodation represents only a very small portion of the volume which the ski lifts can
absorb, but the multiplication of income sources contributes to the equilibrium of the
entire operation of the site for Labellemontagne. The real estate approach is orientated
by the need to reinvest to maintain the level of the site. Real estate plays a decisive role
and the legal mechanisms facilitating these operations have been adapted to operating
issues  rather  than  investment  issues.  Henceforth,  with  tourism residences,  property
investment is no longer necessarily a source of short-term profit, but constitutes a way of
ensuring that operation is profitable. The aim is to ensure that the facilities are filled and
thus guarantee their operation. The developer/manager of the residence is in a dominant
position, as during the Snow Plan era, as shown by the unilateral reviewing of the rental
sums  for  flat-owners  to  compensate  for  any  management  difficulties  encountered.
Finally, accommodation allows the operating income of a resort to be diversified beyond
the ski lifts alone. Moreover, it is noteworthy that only this type of medium-sized resort
(resorts which have the reputation of being difficult) is open to this type of strategy
without any danger of a monopoly and welcomes the intervention of a leader in the
tourism sector to boost local activity.
16 Indeed,  the  possibility  of  occupying  a  prominent  position  on  the  commercial
accommodation scene is a prerequisite for Labellemontagne before it starts to operate on
the site. By occupying both the accommodation and ski lift slots, the group occupies a
dominant position which it intends to use to be a real driving force in the tourism sector,
in particular in terms of defining the target clientele of the resort and thus the prices.
Moreover,  its  aims go beyond simply leisure property and affect  a variety of  service
providers, involving them in “all-inclusive” products associated with accommodation (in
particular  the  hire  of  ski  equipment).  The  group’s  strategy  aims  to  guarantee  its
intervention strength by its internal structuring (sharing of marketing, communication
and sales skills internally and of some centralised administrative and accounting services
to  reduce  the  costs  of  each  site)  based  on  its  use  of  local  social  and  professional
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structures. From this angle, a certain form of underlying regional integration exists in the
intervention of the Labellemontagne group.
 
The Compagnie des Alpes, federalism at the service of a group?
17 Conversely to the Labellemontagne group, the CDA has adopted a different strategy to
secure its activity, with a source of income outside the mountain area and winter sports
resorts, thanks to the leisure sector and amusement parks, whilst only conserving those
winter sports sites where operation appears to be stabilised.  These are resorts on an
international scale which have no image problems and are at a sufficiently high altitude
to ensure “guaranteed snow coverage”, if necessary using snow-making equipment.
18 De facto, the CDA occupies a prominent place on the French winter sports market, with a
constellation  of  resorts  which  dominate  the  national  offer  both  economically  and
geographically17: CDA resorts represent 1/3 of the French power moment and 65% of the
power moment of resorts in the perimeter of the Assemblée des Pays Tarentaise Vanoise
(Tarentaise Vanoise districts group) (IRSTEA resorts database, 2012). Are fears concerning
the abuse of a dominant position and a stranglehold on the ski market which worry the
local stakeholders18, in particular the public stakeholders, founded? How does the CDA
mobilise the expertise acquired through its action on national and international markets?
These  issues  concern  both  the  economic  strategy  of  a  group  and  its  legitimacy  in
managing a public service activity originally intended to be an instrument for regional
development. In particular, financial objectives are of prime importance and are linked to
the CDA’s  position on the stock market.  Nothing guarantees their  compatibility with
regional development and organisation of the local economic life.
19 One of the messages upheld by the CDA consists in asserting its proximity with lands on
which resorts are located through the room for manoeuvre left to local teams. Indeed,
managing a resort involves the site itself having a minimum amount of means in terms of
personnel and equipment. In concrete terms, federalism is imposed but must not mask
managers’ freedom of action. As managers of the largest ski lift companies in France,
their credibility lies both in their ability to make decisions autonomously and on their in-
depth knowledge of the running of the resorts. Their professional mobility contributes
directly to their training, by confronting them both with different functions and actions
in different contexts. Finally, they are more than just puppets executing the strategy of a
group. They constitute a real source of proposals multiplied by the number of sites they
manage. Local experimentation and the sharing of this experimentation thus contribute
to innovation on the scale of CDA. Coordination between regions hosting resorts and
management of the resorts by the CDA is therefore established, in particular in terms of
the choice of the operating company most likely to contribute to the general interest
through the management of  a public service for which the municipality remains the
guarantee.
20 Backed by the CDC, the CDA does in fact have significant means to implement its strategy
and enjoys privileged access to credit. On the one hand, the ability to mobilise capital
from banking sources can be considered favourable for the quality of the ski areas which
the  company  runs,  but  on  the  other  this  contributes  to  restricting  the  opening  to
competition of  the delegation of  management of  the sites in its  care.  Thus,  the host
municipalities are to some extent (since they remain the delegating authority) bound by
excellence: the investments made by the group’s subsidiaries participate in the increase
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of the entry fee for new managers, which restrict the opening of calls for tenders, unless
the municipality can find the means to reduce this entry fee in its own resources19.
21 The game of excellence is all the more risky in that the CDA has an ability to analyse the
demand and commercial  clout,  unparalleled in the winter  sports  sector.  Its  range of
resorts allows it to reach a very broad range of customers, in particular international, and
to  compile  very  detailed  knowledge  of  their  practices  and  expectations.  Indeed,  the
Company can thus  argue that  it  has  the ability  to  grasp the current  trends,  and its
expertise endows it with a structuring echo with municipalities which do not dispose of
this level of information. Thus, the commercial issue also contributes to clouding the
issue  of  Public  Service  Delegation  (DSP)  by  isolated  municipalities  whereas  the  CDA
manages a variety of sites more or less directly connected to each other.
 
Savoie Stations Participations, is the département
obliged to adapt to the new management practices?
22 Faced with these groups, the Savoie département has updated its intervention in the field
of winter sports. Where Savoie was proud to announce in 1945 (Marcelpoil et al., 2011) its
ability to support a project which private initiative alone could not envisage, it  must
today  come  to  terms  with  a  very  different  landscape.  It  must  face  up  to  strong
stakeholders, structured along the lines of the CDA, in order to optimise an operating
phase  of  the  resort  tool  for  which  the  département  appears  less  apt  than  for  the
development phase. Technical expertise, gleaned from the experience of Courchevel, has
given the département a dominant position. This position is also linked to the FACET20,
displaying not only the success of the département’s experience, but also affording it a
view of the various projects currently under development. 
23 Today, the mature market context restricts the legitimacy of action of a département for
which the secure income results  from the primacy of  its  action in the winter sports
sector.  With the assertion of  groups in the delegation of  ski  lift  services,  the Savoie
Conseil  Général  is  faced  with  stakeholders  with  strong  internal  expertise  and  often
managing a greater number of domains than it does itself. For example, in relation to all
the resorts in new sites, Courchevel excels in the development of hotels, in particularly
luxury hotels, but tends to be closer to “village” resorts such as Chamonix, Megève or Val
d’Isère rather than 3rd generation resorts strongly marked by the development of second
homes. 
24 In  this  context,  the  département  asserted  its  intention  to  claw  back  the  regional
development of resorts with the implementation of the tourism plan. First of all, it asserts
its  ability  to  act  with the  releasing of  considerable  credit  drawn from departmental
property, in particular the sale of real estate in Courchevel. By selling this property, the
cycle is complete: The subsidies generated by running a resort are channelled into winter
sports and regional development. By reallocating these funds into a broad spectrum of
resorts, the département is no longer simply seeking to draw the maximum amount of
profit from the site it is running itself, but is rather seeking to allocate means correctly
over its entire territory as a public stakeholder. With the Tourism Plan, a willingness to
develop a  “summer” part  appears,  whilst  maintaining a  “connected domains”  theme
which is the basis of its action with regard to tourism development. This part of the
departmental  policy  reveals  a  change  of  position.  Whereas  previously  it  was  in a
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pioneering position, in this case it is a “follower” of the Rhône-Alpes region and the Isère
department  which have  already initiated this  type  of  action,  respectively  since  1995
(contracts  between  resorts  and  companies  in  the  region)  and  2003  (diversified
development  contracts  in  Isère),  without  having  solved  the  delicate  matter  of
diversification.
25 How are we to understand this change in the position of the département and the place
held  by  Savoie  Stations  Participations  (SSP21)  financial  holding  company,  in  such  a
context? Is this a sign of the Conseil Général’s ability to adapt, wishing to accompany the
evolution of the role of resorts in the context of regional development or an evolution of
the role and status of resorts in regional development? 
26 The reality has in effect changed and the practice of subsidies, considered on a case by
case basis  according to  criteria  specific  to  each resort  and the structuring of  its  ski
holiday  offer,  seems  outdated  today.  An  approach  integrating  criteria  for  economic
success seems in practice to be a guarantee of relevance for effective allocation of public
credit.  This  tends  to  promote  a  regional  capitalism approach  which  involves  giving
preference to the local distribution of the wealth created and accumulated via the resorts.
This dimension of the SSP is eminently political and should be assessed in comparison to
the practices implemented, but a significant difference with a purely private stakeholder
doubtlessly lies in the level of requirement with regard to assessment of the benefits (not
only  monetary  but  also  quality  of  life,  job  creation,  spillover  effects  in  the  areas
concerned, etc.) and in the maximisation of profits in the more or less short term.
27 Finally, SSP makes the profitability of resorts one of the criteria for regional development
in order for the development of winter tourism to accompany the economic life of the
regions without its operating and/or investment costs compromising their future. The
questions lie in the ability of SSP to bring its participation to a broad range of resorts.
How should the order of priority be established? Less profitable sites,  whatever their
potential, are in the most danger, but giving them priority would risk weakening SSP.




28 The slide from resort construction to their current management has occurred in step
with  a  renewal  of  the  stakeholders  and  their  management  methods.  The  significant
constraints in each of these large centres of tourist activity (the accommodation facilities
are suffering from ageing and from beds leaving the market whereas ski lifts remain a
highly capitalistic activity) encourages the stakeholders to adopt a sector-based approach
to maximise their activity.
29 Moreover, the question hanging over the ability of the regional authorities to manage the
resorts has led the organising authorities to turn to private managers. This introduction
of  new stakeholders  in the running of  the resorts  or  the transformation of  the sole
developer  into  a  simple  ski  lift  operator  may have  profoundly  modified  the  resorts’
anchoring policies.
30 Paradoxically,  whereas  in  times  gone by the  door  was  thrown open to  an increased
regionalisation of resorts set up in the context of the Snow Plan, the trend is now rather
towards a sector-based approach initiated by groups specialised in ski lift management
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and whose growth strategy involves deploying their activities on different sites. As the
resort approach is not global, it encourages an approach by trades, the ski lift profession
being the most fruitful branch. 
31 Thus,  groups  such  as  CDA,  Labellemontagne  and  to  a  certain  extent  SSP  propose  a
horizontal approach to resorts managed on multiple territories,  whereas the regional
approach  favours  the  vertical  integration  of  tourism.  This  calls  into  question  the
sustainability of resorts as a tool for regional development according to two main themes.
32 Firstly, developing resorts has contributed to the constitution of an innovative tourist
environment in the Tarentaise area. What is the innovation capacity of the resorts and
how can this movement come to terms with globalised stakeholders? Today this seems to
be directed towards questions of promotion and commercialisation but is it really going
to last? Secondly, the question of the distribution of the fruits of running the ski areas
arises.  How far do the profits  made by a group benefit  the area where the resort  is
located? There is indeed a risk of transfer between areas or redeployment in the various
activities of the group (e.g. amusement parks for the CDA). The question of inter-area
transfer is particularly interesting insofar as it can hide particularly contrasting, if not
opposing, realities: On the one hand, they may constitute a factor sharing the operating
risks and reasserting the role of resorts in land-use planning, but on the other, contribute
to  a  single  stakeholder  gaining  a  hold  over  the  winter  sports  sector  by  assuming  a
dominant position. 
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NOTES
1.  This  period is  only indicative insofar as  the Snow Plan has never been the object  of  any
planning.
2.  Service d’Études d’Aménagement Touristique en Montagne (Department for the Research and
Planning of Tourism in the Mountains)
3.  Interministerial Commission for the Development of Tourism in the Mountains.
4.  The same group which actively contributed to the construction of Courchevel 1850 headed by
M. Michaud who would later be dubbed the Snow Dictator (Arnaud, 1975).
5.  In the same way, C.Perriand’s family is from Yenne, G. Rey-Millet who worked with her at Les
Arcs  is  from  the  Haute-Savoie  area,  G.  Regairaz  is  from  Chambéry  and  in  the  same  team,
B. Taillefer,  from  Cal  d’Isère  is  symbol  of  the  upward  social  mobility  made  possible  by  the
construction of the resorts, as are R. and Y Blanc for Les Arcs.
6.  FDES, Economic and Social Development Fund.
7.  FSIR, Special Roads Investment Fund.
8.  FAL, Local Action Fund.
9.  The concept of the sole developer is central to the development approach advocated by the
Snow Plan. Roger Godino represented this promoter for the resort at Les Arcs in Savoie.
10.  Société d’Équipement de la Vallée des Belleville. (Belleville Valley Equipment company)
11.  The  link  between the  CDC and winter  sports  did  not  stop  at  Belleville,  as  the  financial
organisation is the main lender for local authorities. 
12.  Société  Civile  Immobilière  de  la  Vallée  des  Belleville.  (Belleville  Valley  non-trading  real
estate company)
13.  Source: BD Stations 2012 (IRSTEA) / STRMTG 2011
14.  The power moment corresponds to the product of the passenger flow by the total altitude
difference of a resort’s ski lifts (source: STRMTG). 
15.  Public authorities seek to attract industry leaders by advantageous installation conditions
(property  acquisition  and exclusive  rights  to  development  licenses)  and a  convincing,  stable
development model.
16. The recent bankruptcy of Transmontagne underlined the risks involved in running a ski area
and affected a group which was assumed to be sound, given the deployment of its assets in a
broad spectrum of resorts and activities, both for ski lifts and leisure property.
17.  The CDA also has variable shares in 14 large resorts in France: Val d’Isère, Tignes, Méribel, La
Rosière, Valmorel, Serre-Chevalier, Les 2 Alpes, Chamonix, Flaine, les Arcs, la Plagne, Sainte Foy,
les Menuires, Peisey-Vallandry.
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18.  Local elected representatives also criticise the CDA for placing the decision-making centre at
a distance: “What the elected representatives criticise the CDA for is not the way they run the
resorts, they are very professional, there are no worries on that score. It is simply the fact that
final decisions are increasingly made in Paris.”
19.  Thus, without this being a groundswell movement, several local authorities hosting resorts,
sometimes  large  ones,  are  considering  taking  over  management  of  their  site:  “Today,  the
municipality is in a position to take over…What I am saying is simply that today if you are [in a
large resort] and you believe in winter sports, you can allow yourself this kind of madness. But I
would not be reasoning like this if I was just at la Clusaz”
20.  FACET, Departmental Support Fund for Municipalities for Tourism.
21.  Shares of the SSP Holding, founded in 1991 in the following resorts:  SEDS, 100%;
SETAM,  43.78%;  SAMSO,  13.33%;  SEMAB,  11.55%;  SEMVAL,  10.00%;  Pralognan-
Labellemontagne,  10.00%; Valloire SEM, 9.29%; Jaillet SEM, 6.98%;  Bauges SEM, 5.04%;
Mont-Cenis SEM, 4.74%; Val d’Arly SEM, 4.58%; Crest Volland-Labellemontagne, 2.51%;
Megève ski lift company, 2%; Société des Trois Vallées 0.003%, STOR, 1 share.
RÉSUMÉS
Developing  tourist  facilities  in  the  mountains  is  often  based  on  an  approach  evoking  its
“enhancement” (Guérin, 1984) based on massive investments sustained by heavy funding from
the outside. However, local actors, private as public ones, were not passive and they also brought
their  investments,  ideas  to  develop  mountain  tourism.  Growth  of  ski  resorts  has  thus  been
relying  on  crossed  local  and  global  forces,  leading  to  a  diversity  of  local  developments.
Nevertheless,  nowadays,  in  a  strongly competitive  context,  their  becoming  is  uncertain,
specifically linked to cableway companies’ strategies and organisation. Thus, the analyse of three
pattern of management, through three cableway managers, involved in Tarentaise’s resorts will
aim to highlight the regional factor and its consequences for local development in Savoie.
INDEX
Keywords : ski resort, winter destinations, regionalisation, tourism developer and manager,
Tarentaise Valley, cableway companies
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